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Recent Developments
Harris v. State

I

n Harris v. State, 344 Md.
497, 687 A.2d 970, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed the lower court's decision
that authorized a trial court to
order the Public Defender's Office
to appoint standby counsel for a
defendant who willingly waived
his right to counsel. Although it
acknowledged that the trial court
retains such power in specific
instances, the court of appeals held
that this case did not warrant a
showing of the requisite factual
background to allow such action.
In so holding, the court offered a
narrow precedent limiting the
ability of a defendant to invoke the
assistance of counsel.
Defendant Bruce Wayne
Koenig ("Koenig") was charged
with the murder of his parents, and
subsequently faced the death
penalty or life in prison without
parole. Although informed of the
seriousness of the charges against
him, Koenig willingly waived his
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel due to disagreements with the initial
attorney appointed to him by the
State. Koenig later requested the
assistance of standby counsel to
help formulate his defense.
In response to this request, the
trial court ordered the Public
Defender's Office ("OPD") to
appoint standby counsel. The
OPD appealed to the court of
special appeals, and argued that
the trial court lacked the requisite
statutory authority to order such
action. In response to the inter-
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mediate appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's action, the
OPD petitioned for certiorari from
the court of appeals.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by examining the statutory basis for the OPD's
argument. The OPD asserted that
the trial court misinterpreted
Article 27 A of the Maryland Code,
which provides for the constitutional guarantees of a defendant's
right to counsel. Harris v. State,
344 Md. 497, S08, 687 A.2d 970,
97S. The court agreed with the
underlying message of the statute,
and acknowledged the right to
representation under the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at S04, 687 A.2d
at 973. The court limited this
broad interpretation, however, by
citing Faretta v. State, 422 U.S.
806 (197S). In Faretta v. State,
the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant is entitled to "a
choice between representation by
counsel and
selfrepresentation," but not both.
Harris at SOS, 687 A.2d at 973-74
(quoting Farretta, 422 U.S. at
82S).
Based on this premise, the

court of appeals rejected the
argument that Koenig was entitled
to a type of "hybrid" representation. Id. at 505, 687 A.2d at 974.
For support, the court referred
extensively to Parren v. State, 309
Md. 260, S23 A.2d S97 (1987). In
Parren, the court of appeals held
tha~ "[t]he
[two] rights are
mutually exclusive, and the defendant cannot assert both simultaneously." Harris at 505, 687
A.2d at 974 (quoting Parren, 309
Md. at 264, 523 A.2d at 599). In
justifying its position, the court of
appeals pointed out that such a
hybrid relationship is merely the
availability of counsel to provide
assistance to the pro se defendant,
and is therefore not seen as
"representation." Id. at SII, 687
A.2d at 977. Since such assistance
failed to fall into one of the two
mutually exclusive categories of
constitutionally protected representation
(representation
by
counsel and representation pro se),
the court determined that there was
no underlying basis for a hybrid
right to exist. Id. at 511, 687 A.2d
at 977.
Next, the court focused on
determining whether Koenig
validly waived his constitutional
right to representation. Id. at SOS,
687 A.2d at 974. The court
recognized that in certain instances, it is within the discretion
of the trial court to appoint standby
counsel. Id. at S06, 687 A.2d 974.
Distinguishing the facts of the
instant case from previous
decisions that upheld court orders
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 67
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for standby counsel, the court of
appeals concluded that the trial
court forced the OPD to serve as
standby counsel for a defendant
who knowingly and willingly
waived his right to counsel. Id. at
508,687 A.2d at 975.
The court referred to the Public
Defender Act that outlines the
duties of the OPD, and presented
in detail several sections of Article
27 A, indicating that the OPD is
expected to provide the constitutional guarantee of representation, in conjunction with "related
necessary services." Id at 508-09,
687 A.2d at 975-76. The OPD
argued that when examined in the
context of Parren, defendant's
informed and willing waiver of
counsel, within the context of
Maryland Rule 4-214, negates any
right the defendant would otherwise have to such representation.
Id at 510, 687 A.2d at 976. The
court concluded that this reasoning
retracted the right of the trial court
to order the OPD to appoint
standby counsel. Id at 511, 687
A.2d at 977.
To ensure the validity of the
decision, however, the court examined an instance where representation should be provided by
the OPD despite the lack of constitutional entitlement. Id at 511,
687 A.2d at 977. The court
acknowledged that a defendant
addressing a pretrial procedure
often requires the assistance of
counsel. Id at 512, 687 A.2d at
977 (citing Webster v. State, 299
Md. 581,474 A.2d 1305 (1984)).
Although the Sixth Amendment
does not specifically authorize this
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 68

service, the Public Defender Act
provides for such assistance in
order to promote fairness to the
defendant in such a critical stage of
the proceedings. Id. at 511-12,
687 A.2d at 977.
The
court
of appeals
distinguished the instant case from
Webster, however, by indicating
that such representation is expressly provided for the defendant
in the Public Defender Act in "all
stages of the proceedings." Id at
513, n.11, 687 A.2d at 977. In the
instant case, the fact that Koenig
knowingly and willingly waived
his right to counsel prohibits the
OPD from being forced to provide
standby assistance. Id at 514, 687
A.2d at 978. Although the State
argued that the phrase "related
necessary services" should apply
to such representation, the court
rejected the State's interpretation
of the statute and determined that
the OPD's contention was indeed
correct. Id
Harris v. State presents a
hurdle for future pro se defendants.
Although a defendant is entitled to
self representation, there will
always be a moment when assistance would be beneficial to one
who is unfamiliar with the
technicalities of the law. If a person chooses to assume responsibility for his representation
by willingly and knowingly discharging coUnsel, he essentially
relinquishes all rights to courtappointed assistance should the
OPD refuse to provide standby
assistance. Therefore, the possibility is created that a defendant
may retain counsel with whom he

does not completely agree out of
fear that potential obstacles could
defeat his case completely. This
decision narrows the options of
defendants in criminal cases, and
forces the legal world to carefully
scrutinize the phrase "effective
assistance of counsel."

